HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Mid-Continent Casualty Company ("Mid-Continent") appeals the district court's final judgment that Mid-Continent has a duty to indemnify Davis Construction in the underlying wrongful death action brought by the family of decedent Jorge Serrato ("Serrato"). We AFFIRM the district court's ruling, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Serrato was an independent contractor and not an employee of Davis Construction.
In June 2007, decedent Serrato fell through a hole on the second floor of a construction site where he was working as part of a framing crew for Davis Construction and eventually died from the fall. Davis Construction, owned by Roger Davis, was in the business of framing buildings (typically residential) and obtained jobs by bidding on projects with general contractors. Roger Davis or Bill Ritchie would hire crew members for projects Davis Construction was awarded. Davis Construction worked on one job at a time and, therefore, only used one crew. Typically, Davis Construction's crew consisted of four people in addition to Ritchie,
Following the accident, the Serratos
At the time of Serrato's accident, Davis Construction had a Commercial Lines Policy, issued by Mid-Continent under policy number 04-GL000660872 with an effective policy period from January 24, 2007 to January 24, 2008 (the "Policy"). The Policy contained two relevant coverage exclusions to which the Policy does not apply:
Mid-Continent claims that because Serrato was an employee of the insured, Davis Construction, exclusions "d" and "e" of the Policy apply to exclude coverage for losses resulting from the Underlying Lawsuit.
The district court conducted a bench trial and issued a nine-page Memorandum Order and Opinion making findings of fact and conclusions of law. The following day, the district court signed its final judgment, declaring that Serrato was an independent contractor — not an employee of Davis Construction — and, therefore, Mid-Continent has a duty to indemnify Davis Construction in the Underlying Lawsuit.
In an appeal from a district court's final judgment following a bench trial, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and review conclusions of law de novo. Dickerson v. Lexington Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir.2009). Under this standard, "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).
The determination of whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor is a conclusion of law to be reviewed de novo. Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir.1997). However, "[f]indings on the Limestone factors themselves" are factual determinations and, therefore, are reviewed for clear error. Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 445 Fed.Appx. 756, 759 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); cf. Brock v. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir.1987).
The issue before us is whether the district court erred in concluding that Mid-Continent had a duty to indemnify Davis Construction because Serrato was an independent contractor and not an employee of Davis Construction.
When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, as it is in this case, we apply the substantive law of the forum state "in an attempt to rule as a [forum state's] court would if presented with the same issues." Musser Davis Land Co. v. Union Pac. Res., 201 F.3d 561, 563 (5th Cir.2000). Therefore, because the forum state here is Texas, we apply the Texas definition of "employee" and "independent contractor" in our analysis.
In Texas, determining whether an individual is acting in the capacity of an "independent contractor" or as an "employee" requires assessment of the amount of control the employer exerts or has the right to exert over the "progress, details, and methods of operations of the work." Limestone Prod. Distrib. Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex.2002). The Texas Supreme Court set forth the following five factors to assess whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor:
Id. at 312. Importantly, "the legal test for determining independent-contractor status in Texas is right to control, not comparison of control." Id.
The district court, after conducting a trial on the merits during which testimony was heard from five witnesses about who controlled Serrato's fate, held that Serrato was an independent contractor and not an employee of Davis construction based on an analysis explicitly applying the five factors laid out by the Texas Supreme Court in Limestone. We examine the district court's analysis of each of the five Limestone factors, reviewing each of these factual determinations for clear error. Amerisure, 445 Fed.Appx. at 759.
Considering the first Limestone factor, "the independent nature of the worker's business," the district court acknowledged that this factor "does very little to shed light on ... Davis' right to control the crew's work," and Mid-Continent concedes that the district court's analysis of this factor "was inconclusive."
The district court found that, "[t]he second Limestone factor, `the worker's obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and material to perform the job' weighs heavily in favor of finding that Jorge Serrato was an independent contractor." Though framing crew member Vidal Negrete testified that Davis Construction provided some of the tools to the crew members,
At oral argument, Mid-Continent contended that the district court's finding that, "there is no evidence that Davis or Davis Construction ever provided any of the crew members with tools" (emphasis added) was clearly erroneous.
The district court held that the third Limestone factor, "the worker's right to control the progress of the work except about final results," also supported finding that Serrato was an independent contractor and not employee of Davis Construction. See Limestone, 71 S.W.3d at 312. The freedoms that the district court correctly lists to support its third Limestone factor analysis — that the crew members were free to choose when to start and stop work each day and decided among themselves which particular task each worker would perform and the ways in which tasks were to be completed — are supported by evidence in the record. See id. (finding that a worker's ability to set his own hours supports a finding that the worker was an independent contractor);
Mid-Continent argues that Davis Construction, not Serrato or the other crew members, controlled the progress of the work because Davis tried to come by the job site once a day to check on the work and supervisor Ritchie reported to Davis daily on the progress being made on the job. However, Davis did not control each step of the progress of the job; instead, he only made sure that the work was being done according to blueprints, identified any problems with the work and asked that they be corrected, and tried to speed up the work if it was progressing too slowly. See Limestone, 71 S.W.3d at 313 (holding that where evidence establishes that employer "merely controlled the end sought to be accomplished" and the worker "controlled the means and details of accomplishing the work," the worker was an independent contractor).
The district court found that the fourth Limestone factor, "the time that the worker is employed," supported a finding that Serrato was an independent contractor because Serrato was "employed for two week time periods several times over the course of approximately eighteen months." See id. at 312. The district court's factual findings that support its analysis of this factor — that crew members were only employed by Davis Construction for the time that it takes to complete one job and that there was no guarantee that Davis would hire a crew member for the next job or that there will even be a next job — are supported by testimony at trial. Davis testified at trial that the crew members only get paid if they are working a job, stating, "[i]f they don't work, no, sir, there is no pay." Moreover, the evidence shows that one crew member, Eduardo Negrete, worked for Davis Construction for three or four years, but not continuously, and "left in 2008 and all when work got slow." Eduardo Negrete later returned to working for Davis.
Mid-Continent argues that the fact that Ritchie had worked continuously for Davis Construction for seventeen years and Vidal Negrete for eight years when Serrato's accident occurred in 2007 supports a finding that Serrato and the other crew members were employees. However, a long-term relationship does not necessarily mean that relationship is employer-employee. See id. at 310 (holding that a driver who had worked for the same entity for more than three years was an independent contractor). More importantly, Serrato, the subject of the district court's analysis, had only been working for Davis Construction for approximately eighteen months to two years prior to his June 2007 accident. Therefore, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred when it credited testimony that the fourth Limestone factor supported a finding that Serrato was an independent contractor.
Finally, the district court found that the fifth Limestone factor, "the method of payment, whether by unit of time or by the job," weighed strongly in favor of finding that Serrato was an independent contractor.
Mid-Continent argues that the district court erred in its fifth Limestone factor analysis because there is testimony in the record from crew members Vidal Negrete and Hector Sanchez that they were paid at an hourly rate. However, there is also ample conflicting testimony from Davis and Ritchie that crew members were not paid hourly and were, instead, paid a weekly rate, which varied based on the job, and was the same rate regardless of how many hours they actually work each week.
In sum, the facts of this case may be analogized to the facts of Limestone, where the Texas Supreme Court held that summary judgment evidence established that Mathis, a distributor, was, as a matter of law, an independent contractor. 71
The district court did not abuse its discretion because, as discussed above, there is evidence in the record to support the factual findings the district court made that four of the five Limestone factors, the remaining factor being inconclusive, weigh in favor of the conclusion that Serrato was an independent contractor and not an employee of Davis Construction.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's final judgment that Mid-Continent has a duty to indemnify Davis Construction in the underlying wrongful death action brought by the family of decedent Serrato, based on a conclusion that Serrato was an independent contractor.